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ABSTRACT
Penetration testing of networks is a process that is overused when demonstrating or evaluating the
cyber security posture of an organisation. Most penetration testing is not aligned with the actual intent
of the testing, but rather is driven by a management directive of wanting to be seen to be addressing
the issue of cyber security. The use of penetration testing is commonly a reaction to an adverse audit
outcome or as a result of being penetrated in the first place. Penetration testing used in this fashion
delivers little or no value to the organisation being tested for a number of reasons. First, a test is only
as good as the tools, the tester and the methodology being applied. Second, the results are largely
temporal. That is, the test will likely only find known vulnerabilities that exist at one specific point in
time and not larger longitudinal flaws with the cyber security of an organisation, one such flaw
commonly being governance. Finally, in many cases, one has to question what the point is in breaking
the already broken.
Penetration testing has its place when used judiciously and as part of an overall review and audit of
cyber security. It can be an invaluable tool to assess the ability of a system to survive a sustained
attack if properly scoped and deployed. However, it is our assessment and judgement that this rarely
occurs.
Keywords: cyber security, penetration testing, vulnerability assessment
1. INTRODUCTION
It is important to define and delineate between two oft-confused terms: viz. penetration testing and
vulnerability assessment because penetration testing is not vulnerability assessment, but vulnerability
assessment may utilise penetration testing. Penetration testing is the act of probing a network to
attempt to exploit vulnerabilities using a series of tools and techniques, to achieve penetration and
compromise of the network asset. Vulnerability assessment is about the assessment of a network,
assets, policies and procedures for vulnerability to attack or compromise through a variety of channels
of which penetration testing is just one technique, and one which does not have to be exercised to
achieve a vulnerability assessment.
This paper will explore issues around the overuse of penetration testing as a suitable paragon for
assessing the cyber security posture of organisations. This paper is drawn from our collective
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experiences within an Australian context over the past 5 years and is based on over 80 penetration and
vulnerability assessment exercises of public (Valli, Woodward, & Hannay, 2011) and private
organisations.
2. WHY THE LIMITED CHOICE USE?
The logic behind the use of penetration testing needs examination and exploration. We posit
penetration testing with well-known tool sets such as NMAP, Nessus or OpenVAS is a relatively
simple procedural task. This means that organisations that undertake IT security services with wide
scope penetration testing solely via tool usage are arguably pursuing and receiving a low quality
service. It should be noted that quality professional penetration testers rarely use this as an approach.
The commonly used penetration testing programs are typically verbose in their reporting of discovered
issues. The tools by default will often report a false positive that requires further testing and
verification by experienced IT security professionals. This use of false positives is in fact erring on the
side of caution, i.e. test to be sure and it is a sound concept for the most part. But the amount of reports
we have read when assessing jobs or as precursor to employing our services that list dangerous Linux
or UNIX exploits on a Windows-only network for instance are an all too common occurrence.
These types of naïve penetration tests are often performed by relative novices in the IT security field,
who are hired by large corporate firms as junior employees, who are simply trained to follow a
procedure. While this may seem good business practice we would argue that there is little value-add to
the client, and little long term value for the organisation conducting the test-in fact this type of naïve
test methodology could be detrimental to the testing organisation. The reason for this being that the
organisation has been made no more secure, and when this is discovered, there will be reputational
damage to the organisation which conducted the sub-standard testing.
3. MYTHS TO MANAGEMENT
The following are what the authors call the seven myths to management justifying the need for
penetration testing, and are based on observations and engagement.
3.1 The Penetration Testers Found All of Our Cyber Security Problems
This statement is about as optimistic as panning for gold in your morning shower. Most systems that
have penetration tests done on them rarely fail to achieve entry or compromise, which points to a
larger systemic problem in the security posture of the organisation. This behaviour represents a fairly
typical immature stance which attempts to apply a systematic approach to a systemic problem, the
result being a false sense of security. To paraphrase Dijkstra, “penetration testing can show the
presence of vulnerabilities, but does not prove the absence of vulnerabilities”, the latter being quite a
different perspective.
Many of the tests have poor scoping and poor planning of the process in its entirety. In many cases
when we asked for the business motivation for the testing we found that it was being used as some
token to signal the management there was/or is an issue with cyber security. There is often little posttest follow-up or process around a penetration test as its seen as an atomic process or on time fix
similar to a conventional inoculation.
3.2 Our Penetration Testers are Experienced
Experienced in what exactly? Just because you are competent computer administrator or computer
scientist or network specialist it does not make you a capable penetration tester. The capable
penetration tester is a person who tends to have an in-depth knowledge of networking, at least one
operating system, and can understand how programs run and operate at a systems level. In addition to
these highly advanced IT skills they also need investigative and analysis skills and most importantly a

36

ADFSL Conference on Digital Forensics, Security and Law, 2014
full appreciation of the upstream and downstream consequences of their actions when attempting to
attack systems.
Importantly there are currently no professional standards enforced at a national level in Australia to
become a penetration tester. It is ironic that a system that may be responsible for the provision of
electrical power to a whole city may also be at the mercy of a non-certified, non-registered penetration
tester. And yet, the replacement of light bulb in the same room where that penetration tester has
his/her laptop attached would require the attendance of a licensed and certified electrical contractor to
replace it.
A stark example was that of a major Australia bank seeking new penetration testers to join their
internal testing team. All applicants were subjected to practical standard assessment of their skill base;
a prudent and necessary step. One of the contenders was already employed by another organisation as
a security analyst and specifically listed their skills as a network penetration specialist and was paid in
excess of $100,000 per annum for their services. The problem: the applicant scored 17% on the test,
one of the lowest scores ever recorded. When further probed about his knowledge, the applicant was
unable to articulate basic network protocol information, which would be assumed for the position.
3.3 They Tested All Our Systems
The team may well have done an excellent job of testing hardware and software, but did they test your
wetware? People and processes are key points of failure in any system and we would postulate are
normally the weakest link in any such system. It never ceases to amaze us how often people forget
people in a system.
Some of the most effective systems penetration is achieved through social engineering techniques and
not clamouring away at the keyboard for hours. This includes leaving USB sticks on the floor or in the
car park that staff can subsequently pick up and put into their systems, sending e-mails with
attachments that contain malicious code that staff subsequently open and again allow compromise of
the systems.
It has been our observation that less than 2% of organisations we have tested actually have a cyber
incident response policy. Furthermore, these actual policies rarely translate into plans and processes to
respond, and when an incident occurs, the response ultimately fails if it starts at all.
3.4 You Do Not Understand My Industry
When negative audits do arise one of the key defences by managers or persons responsible is that “you
do not understand my industry”. Whilst that may be true, it is not defensible. A good penetration
tester and vulnerability assessor typically does understand the TCP/IP protocol or how the IT systems
in your industry work. If your systems are found to be vulnerable no amount of industry know-how is
going to save you. A computer is binary: it either works or it does not. There is no middle ground.
3.5 No One Would Be Interested in Us-Why is Management Doing This?
Many organisations, and more importantly IT professionals, are still not aware of the major risk that
insecure configuration and systems presents. In Australia and worldwide there are numerous press
articles and reports that indicate that cyber espionage and cyber attack is an increasing problem (IBM,
2011; Symantec, 2013). These Australian press articles are typically derived from statements by major
businesses and our lead security and intelligence agencies who work in this domain such as Australian
Signals Directorate, Australian Security Intelligence Organisation and CERT Australia (Hilvert, 2012;
Joye, 2013; Wiggins, 2013).
Cyber attack is also no longer a full-frontal contact event. That is, individuals or organisations who are
seeking to attack a particular business will now no longer just attack the intended target in isolation.
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These highly organised criminals are now attacking business associates and partners to glean valuable
intelligence and information about their intended targets. In short, attackers are becoming more
strategic. They do not directly attack executive management, but seek to gain intelligence from lower
levels of management who would not normally consider themselves as being “on the radar” in terms
of cyber warfare. So while you may not be a primary target you may be a secondary or tertiary target
or collateral damage in the overall campaign against another party.
3.6 This Tool Knows it All
Why the tool may actually "know" something about security it as only good as the person using the
console to operate it. All too often we see reviews conducted by individuals or companies that have
limited value and demonstrate a lack of understanding of the key cyber security issues identified by
tool.
In some standout cases we have seen simple, unedited and uncommented outputs from cyber security
software that any individual with a simple procedure sheet and a basic understanding of computing
could accomplish. What is even more galling is that some organisations charge premium rates for this
level of ineptitude. One example was one in excess of $70,000 for running open source Nessus over a
client’s network, with nothing more than a covering letter from a senior partner attached. The cover
letter had no significant analysis, it simply summarised vulnerabilities found as High, Medium and
Low and an offer to extend further services to resolve them. Further, however, it is observed that this
paucity of reporting coupled with large cost is often confused for quality by requesting management.
3.7 We Get Pen. Tested Once a Year. We are Fine!
Sound cyber security practices which include penetration testing, vulnerability assessment and
auditing should be a process that is embedded within any IT system as an ongoing process. The threat
against cyber enabled systems is advanced and persistent. Cyber attacks and incursions are a 24 hours
365 days a year reality for all entities connected to the Internet. So one has to wonder why the annual
deployment of a pen testing team is going to increase your cyber resilience. See Myth 1.
Execution of an ongoing cyber security strategy through good policy backed up with sound processes
evinced as result of bringing in the "testers" to demonstrate the management the risk that cyber
security presents is never evident.
4. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Our position is that we unequivocally support the prudent and judicious use of penetration testing as
part of the execution of an overall cyber security strategy. Testing and assessment with advanced
methods and techniques can reveal vulnerabilities in systems on a number of levels and when
remediated produce a more secure outcome for an enterprise. However, as we have outlined in
presenting the seven myths, there is much effort needed to redress current issues around the fallacious
use of penetration testing in organisations.
We also see an increasing need for more rigorous accreditation and certification of competence in
cyber security and its sub-discipline, penetration testing. The answering of a 300 multi-choice question
test hardly demonstrates advanced skills or competence with relevant tools and techniques. The use of
practical tests as part of an interview process for penetration testers should be an automatic default for
final shortlisted candidates. These tests do not have to be long and arduous but should enable an
organisation to assess an individual's core competencies in penetration testing.
The skill sets needed of a professional penetration tester are highly advanced and are not just about
having strong IT capabilities. There is a need to understand a variety of factors and possess skills
including but not limited to identifying risks, and in the process demonstrating an understanding of
second and third order consequences of actions undertaken in the execution of penetration tests.
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Human management skills and of course effective communication are also key skill sets that are
required of a professional penetration tester.
Organisations, and more importantly persons responsible for the management of the IT and cyber
security function, such as Chief Information Officers and Chief Information Security Officers must
seriously consider what purpose random or symbolic penetration testing of the organisational systems
actually achieves. The penetration tests in of themselves must not be seen as an end, but often the first
step on a journey of re-engineering an organisations cyber security posture through application of
good practice.
Company directors in the case of large organisations need to have a better understanding of the risks
that poor cyber security will present to the organisation. In addition, they should understand the often
substantial further risks the inappropriate use of penetration testing can present to the organisation.
These risks include but are not limited to reputational loss as a result catastrophic failure, possible
partial loss of data or system integrity, all of which when realised have potentially catastrophic
financial and organisational outcomes. This increased understanding will require ongoing education of
company directors, and persons responsible for the management of the IT functions to effectively
understand and address these risks.
Cyber security service providers have an obligation also to ensure that the business practices they
employ allow their staff to generate quality outcomes for their customers. The delivery of a quality
outcome for the customer is largely still the exception rather than the rule currently when it comes to
penetration testing service provision. Service providers, however, are not the root cause of all
malfeasant outcomes relating to penetration testing.
In conclusion, there is currently, and has been for a long time, a shortage of suitably trained and
capable cyber security professionals (including penetration testers). But, this circumstance can only
change when the market has attained a certain level of understanding and demands maturity in service
delivery. The levels of professionalism and the expectation of competence in the whole cyber security
supply chain must lift well above current levels. This needed elevation can only start to occur when
the community of praxis expose and dispel, the myths that have bred to support unbridled exploitative
opportunism that is all too often current penetration testing practise.
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